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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Does Citizens to Save the Birds, Inc. lack standing to
bring suit because no birds were killed by the Forest
Service's timber sale nor is there any guarantee that
any birds will be killed in the future?
II. Is the Migratory Bird Treaty Act "law" with which
agency actions under the National Forest Management
Act must be in accord for purposes of judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act?
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III. Is the Migratory Bird Treaty Act's misdemeanor provi-
sion a strict liability crime given that there is no lan-
guage in the statute indicating otherwise?
IV. Does the United States Forest Service violate the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act if it satisfies all statutory re-
quirements in implementing a forest management plan
in accordance with the National Forest Management
Act?
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STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The statutes relevant to the determination of this case
are the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 et seq.;
the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 et
seq.; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706; the
National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et
seq.; the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528
et seq.; and Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Re-
form Act, Pub. L. 102-381, § 322, all of which are reproduced
in Appendix B. The regulations relevant to this case are
found in 36 C.F.R. § 219.10 and 36 C.F.R. § 219.19, which
also are reproduced in Appendix B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is before the court on appeal from a denial of a
Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, the United States
Forest Service ("Forest Service") and Blackacre Forest Prod-
ucts, Inc. ("Blackacre") against Citizens to Save the Birds,
Inc. ("CSB").
In May, 1997, the Forest Service, an agency within the
Department of Agriculture, authorized a timber sale to
Blackacre in accordance with the National Forest Manage-
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ment Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600, et seq. ("NFMA").' Record 1.
The timber sale permitted Blackacre to clearcut 500 acres,
known as the "Big Tree Tract," in the New Union National
Forest. Record 1. The Big Tree Tract is part of an area of old
growth forest, which is one of few in the New Union National
Forest. Record 1. The New Union National Forest is there-
fore a very valuable timber resource, in addition to being
used for outdoor recreation and study. Record 1. To balance
these diverse interests, the Forest Service developed a land
and natural resource management plan ("the Plan"), for the
New Union National Forest, pursuant to § 1604 of the
NFMA. Record 1. The Plan designated some parts of the old
growth forest, including the Big Tree Tract, for logging and
other parts for preservation. Record 1. The Forest Service, in
compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations, fol-
lowed its normal procedures both for the development of the
Plan and for the timber sale, which included preparation of
an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") as required
under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321, et seq. ("NEPA".) 2 Record 2.
CSB is a non-profit corporation whose purpose is to pro-
tect the avian population resident in and migrating through
the State of New Union. Record 2. CSB claims that its mem-
bers observe birds and enjoy the outdoors in the New Union
National Forest. Record 2. CSB alleges that its members'
use of the Big Tree Tract would be adversely affected if Black-
acre were allowed to clearcut the Big Tree Tract. Record 2.
CSB opposed the timber sale at all stages of the Forest
Service's development of the Plan and during the sale to
Blackacre. Particularly, CSB opposed the Plan and sale on
grounds that clearcutting would result in the direct and indi-
rect deaths of migratory birds that roost and nest in the trees
designated for cutting. Record 2. The Forest Service's EIS
acknowledged the possibility that if cutting occurs during the
spring or summer months, it will result in the loss of nests
with their eggs or chicks. Record 2. Based on a survey, there
1. See Appendix B.
2. See Appendix B.
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would be a little over one hundred migratory bird nests af-
fected if all the timber is cut only during nesting season. Rec-
ord 2. In addition, the EIS recognizes that the clearcutting
may result in some habitat destruction. Neither the Plan nor
the timber sale restricts the season of the year during which
clearcutting is allowed. Record 2.
CSB seeks judicial review of the Forest Service's timber
sale under the NFMA, using the standard for judicial review
set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) ("APA").3 CSB claims that the United States is
foreclosed from any timber sale that authorizes logging which
will kill migratory birds in violation of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 ("MBTA"). 4 Record 2.
The United States moved to dismiss the action, arguing
that CSB lacked standing to raise this dispute, the issue was
not ripe for decision, the MBTA is not law that governs the
timber sale, and regardless, the Forest Service is exempt
from the MBTA's strict liability offense. The Honorable R. N.
Remus, of the United States District Court for the District of
New Union, denied the United States' motion. Record 4.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
CSB lacked standing to bring this suit against the
United States Forest Service. CSB failed to establish that it
has suffered an injury-in-fact because no birds were killed by
the timber sale nor is there any guarantee that any birds will
be killed in the future. Furthermore, even if CSB sustained
an injury, there is no causal connection between the injury
complained of by CSB and the Forest Service's conduct.
Additionally, the district court lacked jurisdiction to en-
tertain CSB's claim under the APA. The lower court's review
of the timber sale improperly, and unnecessarily, duplicated
the NFMA's procedure for reviewing agency action. The
MBTA does not apply to government entities. Therefore, the
MBTA is not "law" with which agency actions under the
NFMA must be in accord for purposes of judicial review.
3. See Appendix B.
4. See Appendix B.
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Concluding otherwise would frustrate the Forest Service's
ability to execute its congressionally delegated duties pursu-
ant to the NFMA. Moreover, judicial review of a potential pe-
nal violation under the MBTA improperly circumvents the
Department of Justice's prosecutorial discretion.
Furthermore, as most circuit courts hold, the MBTA's
misdemeanor offense is a strict liability crime. The statute
lacks a scienter requirement. Congress specifically reiterated
its intention to enact a strict liability offense in its continuous
revisions of the MBTA. The MBTA's scienter-free nature en-
sures efficient enforcement of a significant public welfare
statute.
Finally, regardless of whether the MBTA prohibits the
killing of migratory birds by clearcutting, the timber sale did
not violate the MBTA. The sale was part of a forest manage-
ment plan conducted in accordance with the NFMA. By con-
sidering numerous alternatives, and taking into account
economic, environmental, and societal concerns, the Forest
Service concluded that the benefit resulting from the timber
sale considerably outweighed any potential harm to birds
caused by clearcutting. The Forest Service's decision to im-
plement the Plan was reasonable and should be given sub-
stantial deference by the court in light of the Forest Service's
expertise.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED
THE UNITED STATES' MOTION TO DISMISS
BECAUSE CSB FAILED TO SATISFY THE
NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF STANDING.
Citizens to Save the Birds, Inc. ("CSB") is not injured by
the action complained of and is therefore not the proper party
to bring suit. CSB bears the burden of establishing the ele-
ments of standing as the party invoking federal jurisdiction,
but has failed to do so. First, CSB has not demonstrated that
it has suffered an injury-in-fact. Second, CSB has not shown
that there is a causal connection between the conduct com-
plained of and the alleged injury. Finally, CSB has not
19981 841
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shown that a favorable decision would be likely to redress its
injury. The second and third elements are contingent upon
the first, thus without proof of an injury-in-fact, they need not
be addressed. CSB failed to establish that it has suffered an
injury-in-fact because no birds were killed by the sale of tim-
ber. Therefore, the decision of the district court should be re-
versed, and the United States' motion to dismiss should be
granted.
A. CSB Failed To Satisfy The Injury-In-Fact Requirement
Because There Was No Concrete And Particularized
Injury Nor Was There Any Actual Or Imminent
Injury.
CSB fails to establish an injury-in-fact. Injury-in-fact is
"an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) con-
crete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (hereinafter "Defenders T'). While
aesthetic and environmental well-being are cognizable inter-
ests, the Supreme Court has held that "the ,injury in fact' test
requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest." Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-735 (1972). The interest
also must be particular to the party invoking the action.
Here, CSB failed to make such a showing. Therefore, the ac-
tion must be dismissed.
CSB's contention that its special interest would be ad-
versely affected if Blackacre clearcuts the Big Tree Tract does
not establish an injury-in-fact. See Morton, 405 U.S. at 739
(discussing that a "special interest" by itself is insufficient to
demonstrate an injury-in-fact). In Morton, the Supreme
Court rejected the Sierra Club's claim of a special interest in
conservation of natural game refuges and forests, holding
that the group lacked standing to maintain the action. Id. at
727. Likewise, CSB also lacks standing. Its claim of a special
interest in saving the avian population is not sufficient to
maintain an action. Otherwise, as the Court in Morton
noted, "there would appear to be no objective basis upon
which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide ,special inter-
est' organization... [a]nd if any group with a bona fide ,spe-
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cial interest' could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to
perceive why any individual citizen with the same bona fide
special interest would not also be entitled to do so." Id. at
739.
Moreover, CSB's contention that its activities would be
adversely affected is also insufficient to establish standing.
In Morton, the Court revealed that the Sierra Club did in fact
assert that "[i]ts interests would be vitally affected . . . and
would be aggrieved . . . ." Morton, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8. De-
spite the alleged injury in the pleadings, the Court held that
this allegation was insufficient to establish standing. Id. at
741. CSB asserts no more than the Sierra Club. CSB merely
alleges that its members' use of the forest would be adversely
affected if Blackacre clearcuts the Big Tree Tract. Record 2.
Consistent with the holding in Morton, CSB's contention is
insufficient to establish standing.
CSB also fails to establish imminent injury. CSB specu-
lates that some injury may occur in the future. Record 2. A
claim of future injury lacks the imminence required to estab-
lish an injury-in-fact. ",[Slome day' intentions-without any
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specifica-
tions of when the some day will be-do not support a finding
of the ,actual or imminent' injury that our cases require." De-
fenders I, 504 U.S. at 564 (emphasis in original). In Defend-
ers I, imminence was lacking despite the plaintiffs
demonstration that the disputed agency action would ad-
versely affect its plans to observe endangered species in the
future. Id. The party invoking jurisdiction "must make an
adequate showing that the injury is actual or certain to en-
sue. Assertions of potential future injury do not satisfy the
injury-in-fact test." Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753,
758 (8th Cir. 1994). CSB has done nothing but assert poten-
tial future injury. Record 2. Neither the United States For-
est Service ("Forest Service") nor Blackacre has killed any
migratory birds. Record 3. Furthermore, the Forest Service
will not kill any birds in the future and there is no indication
that Blackacre will do so. Record 3. Bird deaths may occur
as a result of logging only if Blackacre actually logs the Big
Tree Tract and logs it during nesting season. Record 3.
84319981
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Moreover, the Forest Service's Environmental Impact State-
ment ("EIS") states that bird deaths will occur only if cutting
occurs during spring or summer months. Record 2.
The key word is "if." No present injury has occurred, and
there is a possibility that no injury will ever occur. This spec-
ulation as to future injury falls far below the standard re-
quired to show actual or imminent injury. Additionally, there
is no proof that Blackacre is about to log the Tract and no
proof that if it ever logs the Tract it will do so during the nest-
ing season. Record 3. CSB has not alleged any facts demon-
strating that it has or will suffer any injury. Without a
showing of actual and imminent injury, there is no basis to
maintain an action.
Finally, CSB's defective pleading cannot be cured by the
testimony given at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
"The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends upon
the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed." Newman-
Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989). In
the present case, only at the hearing on the motion to dismiss
did the Forest Service and Blackacre acknowledge that
neither of them contemplated notice to or further action by
the Forest Service before Blackacre begins to harvest timber.
Record 2. Blackacre also made a comment at the hearing
that "it will harvest timber during the bird nesting season
.... " Record 2. There is no indication that these facts were
alleged in the filed complaint. These actions by the Forest
Service and Blackacre were untimely, and therefore, CSB
cannot maintain an action. "[Flor the controversy to be ripe,
the complained-of injury must be immediate or imminently
threatened." Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 390
(11th Cir. 1996). CSB failed to make this showing in its com-
plaint and may not assert standing based on actions made
subsequent to the filing of its complaint. Otherwise, this
court would grant judicial approval of CSB's fishing expedi-
tion. A party may not file a complaint without facts sufficient
to maintain the action, with the hope that discovery will lead
to facts sufficient to maintain a cause of action. "The ripeness
doctrine ,prevent[s] the courts, through avoidance of prema-
ture adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/14
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disagreements over administrative policies' as well as ,pro-
tects the agencies from judicial interference until an adminis-
trative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties."' Alcock, 83 F.3d at
390 (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149
(1967)). Since CSB's speculative claim does not fulfill the in-
jury-in-fact requirement, the lower court's decision should be
reversed and the motion to dismiss granted.
B. Even If This Court Finds That CSB Suffered An
Injury-In-Fact, CSB Failed To Show A Causal
Connection Between Injury And Conduct.
CSB fails to show a causal connection between injury and
conduct. In asserting standing, once a party establishes an
injury-in-fact, the party must demonstrate a "causal connec-
tion between the injury and conduct complained of-the in-
jury has to be fairly... traceable to the challenged action of
the defendant . . . ." Defenders I, 504 U.S. at 560. CSB ar-
gues that it is injured by the government's abdication of its
responsibility to protect migratory birds. Record 4. CSB's al-
leged "injury" involves a proposed violation of the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"). The injury complained of by CSB
has no relation to the Forest Service's actions under the Na-
tional Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), thereby eliminat-
ing any causal connection between the injury and conduct.
The Forest Service has not abdicated its responsibility.
Rather, it has fulfilled all the statutory requirements. Record
3; see also Part IV.B., infra. CSB's allegations are so far re-
moved from any action taken by the government, such that it
is virtually impossible to trace the actions of the Forest Ser-
vice to the alleged injury suffered by CSB. Therefore, even if
this court finds that CSB suffered an injury-in-fact, CSB did
not establish a causal connection between injury and conduct.
Causal connection is a requirement for standing with which
CSB failed to comply. CSB has no standing to bring this suit
and the lower court's decision should be reversed.
1998] 845
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II. THE FOREST SERVICE, EMPOWERED BY THE
NFMA WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
NATION'S RENEWABLE RESOURCES, IS
EXEMPT FROM THE MBTA'S
PROHIBITIONS, THEREBY PRECLUDING THE
FOREST SERVICE'S TIMBER SALE FROM
JUDICIAL REVIEW.
The Forest Service, authorized by the NFMA to manage
the nation's forests, is not subject to the restrictions of the
MBTA. The Forest Service performed its duties in accord-
ance with the NFMA, which sets out the only mechanism by
which Forest Service actions may be reviewed. Congress en-
acted the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") to permit ju-
dicial review of agency actions only where authorized by
statute or where no other procedure for review exists. Bowen
v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903-904 (1988). The district
court lacked jurisdiction to review the Forest Service's timber
sale under the APA because the NFMA provides distinct pro-
cedures to review all Forest Service actions.
In addition, the district court had no jurisdiction to re-
view the Forest Service's actions because judicial review can
only occur, pursuant to the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), if the
agency violated a substantive statute and failed to act "in ac-
cordance with law." CSB's claim that the Forest Service's
sale of timber violated the MBTA is without merit because
the MBTA, by its own language, does not apply to govern-
ment agencies. Applying the MBTA to government agencies
would frustrate congressional intent, encroach upon
prosecutorial discretion, and seriously diminish the Forest
Service's ability to efficiently perform its duty under the
NFMA of "managing the nation's renewable resources." 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600(1), 1600(6). In view of these factors, the
MBTA is not "law" with which agency actions under the
NFMA must comply for purposes of judicial review pursuant
to the APA.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/14
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A. Congress Did Not Intend The APA's General Grant Of
Jurisdiction To Duplicate The Special Statutory
Procedures Relating To Specific Agencies.
The APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 2(A), states the scope of review
required by district courts when considering agency actions
which are "otherwise not in accordance with law." "The APA
generally provides a framework for judicial review of final
agency action when an adequate remedy is otherwise lacking,
• . . it does not provide an independent source of jurisdiction
or create a cause of action where none previously existed."
Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, Envtl. Protection
Agency, 882 F.2d 1294, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989) (hereinafter "De-
fenders I"). Because the NFMA provides specific remedies to
guarantee that the Forest Service acted "in accordance with
law," and further provides a framework for obtaining judicial
review, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
CSB's claims.
Federal district courts lack jurisdiction under the APA to
review Forest Service decisions made pursuant to NFMA pro-
visions. "Jurisdiction to review the sales is conferred by the
NFMA, not the APA." Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v.
United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 114 (8th Cir. 1997).
The NFMA provides for a specific and thorough review of the
Forest Service's decisions and actions. Section 1612 of the
NFMA, as amended by the Forest Service Decision Making
and Appeals Reform Act, Pub. L. 102-381, § 322, sets forth
the proper procedure for agency action review, and encour-
ages public participation in the Forest Service's decisions.
"[A] person who was involved in the public comment process"
has the right to appeal the Service's decision to a Secretary
appointed by the Chief of the Forest Service. Pub. L. 102-381,
§ 322(c). "If the Secretary fails to decide the appeal within
the 45-day period, the decision on which the appeal is based
shall be deemed a final agency action for the purpose of chap-
ter 7 of title 5, United States Code." Pub. L. 102-381,
§ 322(d)(4); see also Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc., v. United
States Forest Serv., 843 F. Supp. 1373,1374-1376 (D. Idaho
1994) (discussing the appeals process for Forest Service ac-
1998]
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tions). Permitting judicial review of agency action by a dis-
trict court improperly duplicates the administrative
proceeding. See, e.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879,
903 (1988) ("When Congress enacted the APA to provide a
general authorization for review of agency action in the dis-
trict courts,... it did not intend that general grant of juris-
diction to duplicate the previously established special
statutory procedures relating to specific agencies."); see also
Defenders 11, 822 F.2d at 1302 (applying the same rationale
to review of MBTA violations).
Under this authority, if CSB believed that the Forest
Service violated the MBTA, the proper remedy would have
been to petition the Forest Service for a timely administrative
appeal rather than filing suit with the district court. See De-
fenders 11, 882 F.2d at 1302. In Defenders II, the court of ap-
peals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the
APA to review the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") actions under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act, which provided its own mechanism for
agency action review. Id. at 1303. The Defenders challenged
various EPA actions which had endangered various fowl pro-
tected by the MBTA. Id. at 1297. The court held that if the
Defenders of Wildlife believed that the EPA had not acted "in
accordance with law," it should have petitioned the EPA for
review of the decision. Id. at 1301. Here, the Forest Service
complied with the provisions of the NFMA and its normal
procedures for both the development and sale of timber to
Blackacre. Record 1. Accordingly, the Forest Service acted in
accordance with law and within its authority under the
NFMA. Therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction
to hear CSB's claim under the APA.
B. The Forest Service Was In Full Compliance With All
Required Statutes And The Timber Sale Was Not
Subject To Review Because The Sale Was In
Accordance With The NFMA, Which Supersedes
The MBTA.
The MBTA prohibits the killing of migratory birds. 16
U.S.C. § 703. Concurrently, the NFMA empowers the Forest
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Service with the "management of the Nation's renewable re-
sources," particularly the supply of timber. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600(1), 1600(6). To ensure that migratory birds are ade-
quately protected, the Forest Service, in compliance with the
NFMA and the National Environmental Protection Act
("NEPA"), must provide a comprehensive EIS. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C)(i). The NFMA recognizes that as a consequence of
timber cutting migratory birds are killed, as is evident by the
statutorily mandated EIS. The EIS and supporting regula-
tions restrict agency actions which threaten the viability of
native and certain non-native birds. The Forest Service ac-
ted under the statutory authority conferred by the NFMA,
and complied with its regulations. See Part IV.B., infra.
Therefore, the Forest Service acted "in accordance with,"
rather than against the law, and its decision is not subject to
judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Imposing the MBTA's restrictions upon the Forest Ser-
vice undermines the agency's ability to manage the nation's
renewable resources. "Congress intended that the Forest
Service follow the NFMA's regulatory process, rather than
the MBTA's criminal prohibitions, in addressing conservation
of migratory birds." Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551,
1556 (11th Cir. 1997). Congress enacted the NFMA approxi-
mately sixty years after its enactment of the MBTA. Con-
gress contemplated the killing of birds when it vested the
Forest Service with the authority to cut and sell timber. See
Martin, 110 F.3d at 1556 ("Congress's subsequent enactment
of legislation relating to management of the National Forest
System buttresses the conclusion that the MBTA does not ap-
ply to the federal government."). Only if the Forest Service is
exempt from the MBTA can the agency perform its statuto-
rily imposed duties under the NFMA. The Forest Service did
not violate the law when it sold the timber to Blackacre. The
Forest Service acted in accordance with the NFMA. The tim-
ber sale is therefore not subject to review pursuant to the
APA.
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C. As A Government Agency, The Forest Service Is Not
Subject To The MBTA's Restrictions.
The MBTA was designed to prohibit people-not govern-
ment agencies-from killing migratory birds. To permit judi-
cial review of an agency's actions pursuant to the APA, the
aggrieved party "[miust identify a substantive statute or reg-
ulation that the agency action had transgressed and establish
that the statute or regulation applies to the United States."
Martin, 110 F.3d at 1555. The prohibitions imposed by the
MBTA are limited to "any person, association, partnership, or
corporation" that "kills" various migratory birds. 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(a). Nothing in the statute expressly prohibits govern-
ment agencies from engaging in activities which could harm
migratory birds. Expansion of the MBTA's definition of "per-
son" to include government agencies would offend both the
congressional intent and the MBTA's statutory purpose.
Numerous courts have held that the MBTA, by its plain
language, does not apply to the federal government. As suc-
cinctly expressed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, "The MBTA, by its plain language, does
not subject the federal government to its prohibitions ....
[Accordingly,] the MBTA does not apply to the federal govern-
ment. As no violation of the MBTA could occur by any formal
action of the Forest Service, the Forest Service may not be
enjoined under the APA." Martin, 110 F.3d at 1555-1556.
Had Congress intended the term "person" to embody "govern-
ment" it would have expressly included it within the statute's
definitions. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (defining "person"
as "any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumen-
tality of the Federal Government" in the Endangered Species
Act). "[T]here is no expression of congressional intent which
would warrant holding that ,person' includes the federal gov-
ernment, thus enabling the United States to prosecute a fed-
eral agency . . . for taking or killing birds and destroying
nests in violation of the MBTA." Martin, 110 F.3d at 1555;
see also Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States Forest
Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941) ("Since, in
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common usage, the term ,person' does not include the sover-
eign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed
to exclude it.")). The same rationale applies here. Because
the MBTA does not apply to the Forest Service, the sale is not
reviewable under the APA.
Moreover, the international convention indicates that
Congress enacted the MBTA to protect migratory birds from
"indiscriminate slaughter." See Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96
F.2d 620, 627 (9th Cir. 1938). Government agencies are re-
quired to provide an EIS pursuant to the NEPA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4332(C)(i), to restrain them from arbitrarily killing migra-
tory birds. Congress's implementation of this statutory re-
quirement makes expanding the term "person" to include
"government" unnecessary in view of the treaty's purpose.
The MBTA's purpose is to deter natural persons, not govern-
ment agencies, from killing birds.
Congress did not intend to force the MBTA's provisions
upon the Forest Service. To infer otherwise exceeds the stat-
utory language and undermines the Forest Service's ability to
perform its duties. "An agency's actions could only fail to be
in ,accordance with law' when that agency's actions are sub-
ject to that law .... The MBTA, by its plain language, does
not subject the federal government to its prohibitions." Mar-
tin, 110 F.3d at 1555 (emphasis in original). Moreover, suffi-
cient deterrent and protective measures exist within the
NEPA to ensure that government agencies refrain from the
"indiscriminate slaughter" of migratory birds. The prohibi-
tions imposed by the MBTA are unnecessary. Accordingly,
the actions of the Forest Service are not subject to judicial
review.
D. Judicial Review Is Improper Because Neither The
Judiciary Nor Private Citizens Are Empowered With
The Prosecution Of Crimes.
Judicial review is inapplicable to Forest Service actions
relating to potential penal violations of the MBTA. The
MBTA is a regulatory statute designed to protect migratory
birds by imposing criminal sanctions on would-be offenders.
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16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a), 707(b). The statute provides suffi-
cient and effective remedies designed to deter violations and
redress any harm caused by killing migratory birds. Since
the MBTA is a criminal statute, there is no basis for a private
right of action. Accordingly, CSB's contention that the Forest
Service's actions are subject to review is unfounded. See De-
fenders H, 882 F.2d at 1301-1302 ("Neither the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act nor the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act contain provisions for private rights of action."). The dis-
cretion to prosecute MBTA violations remains with the De-
partment of Justice. CSB cannot bypass the state's authority
by invoking judicial review under the APA.
The remedy for a MBTA violation is the prosecution of
the offending party. The Department of Justice has broad
discretion, subject to Constitutional restraints, in deciding
whether to prosecute the Forest Service. See United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125-126 (1979). The executive
branch, through the Department of Justice, is better situated
than the courts to determine which violations to prosecute.
Thus, substantial deference should be accorded to the
prosecutor.
So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe
that the accused committed an offense defined by statute,
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely
in his discretion. This broad discretion rests largely on the
recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly
ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of
the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's rela-
tionship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are
not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts
are competent to undertake.
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-608 (1985). CSB
asked the district court to review the Forest Service's compli-
ance with the MBTA, a criminal statute. CSB's request was
improper because judicial review of the Forest Service's ac-
tions requires a finding that the agency failed to act "in ac-
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/14
MOOT COURT
cordance with law." In other words, review would result in a
judicial declaration that the Forest Service committed a
crime. However, it is not the function of the court to deter-
mine whether a crime was committed. See United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-344 (1974) (discussing the grand
jury's role in determining whether probable cause exists that
a crime occurred). It is the prosecutor's function to charge
crimes and the grand jury's function to indict. Only thereaf-
ter is judicial review warranted under the APA. Otherwise,
judicial review would improperly circumvent the govern-
ment's authority to prosecute.
III. THE MBTA IS A REGULATORY STATUTE
DERIVED FROM AN INTERNATIONAL
TREATY, WHICH PROTECTS PUBLIC
WELFARE BY IMPOSING MINOR
PENALTIES FOR STRICT LIABILITY
MISDEMEANORS.
A violation of the MBTA is a strict liability crime. The
MBTA misdemeanor provision, 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), pertaining
to the killing of migratory birds, does not mention intent or
any other culpable mens rea element. An analysis of the stat-
ute, its penalties, and legislative history indicates that Con-
gress specifically intended the MBTA's misdemeanor offense
to be construed without a scienter requirement. In determin-
ing whether an otherwise silent criminal statute is one of
strict liability, the court must consider whether: 1) the stat-
ute is regulatory in nature; 2) the statute was enacted to pro-
tect public welfare; 3) the offense and statute have their
origins in the common law; and 4) the penalties imposed for a
violation are relatively minor. Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 256-259 (1952).
The MBTA protects migratory birds that are instrumen-
tal to the well-being of our nation's agricultural industry.
United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D.Ky.
1939); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). The
MBTA is derived from an international treaty and has under-
gone substantial modifications since its enactment. These
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changes led to an efficient regulatory scheme with propor-
tional criminal sanctions. In addition, Congress specifically
reiterated its intention to maintain an absence of scienter
with respect to the MBTA's misdemeanor provision in its en-
actment of various amendments. In view of these factors, the
district court properly concluded that the MBTA is a strict
liability offense.
A. Although Originally Enacted To Implement An
International Treaty, The MBTA Was Expanded
Beyond The International Convention's Concerns
To Include Additional Protection Of Migratory
Birds.
The MBTA developed into a formidable and effective reg-
ulatory statute as a result of numerous amendments and re-
visions. Congress enacted the MBTA in 1918 to implement
the goals of a 1916 treaty between the United States and
other nations. Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States
Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 114-115 (8th Cir. 1996). Despite
the original intention of the 1916 international accords, the
MBTA was expanded to invoke congressional powers to ac-
complish purposes other than those enumerated in the inter-
national treaty. Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620, 627
(9th Cir. 1938).
As a result of numerous international conventions, the
MBTA developed to include treaties signed with other na-
tions. See United States v. North Dakota, 650 F.2d 911, 913
n.2 (8th Cir. 1981). Additionally, the Act was augmented to
include regulations restricting various activities not other-
wise required by the international treaty. See Cerritos Gun
Club, 96 F.2d at 627. The Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916
sought to protect birds by restricting the killing of birds to
seasons when impact on breeding would be minimal. Con-
gress expanded the "seasonal" based restrictions by addition-
ally prohibiting the "manner" and "means" by which a legal
killing may occur.
Here again Congress provides not only for the ,extent, if at
all' to ,allow hunting,' but also the ,means' of ,taking, cap-
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turing, killing,' the migratory fowl. Such ,means' are com-
patible with the terms of the convention limiting the ,time'
of hunting, for they are not only not derogatory to it, but,
on the contrary, also carry out the purposes of the conven-
tion preamble. It therefore appears that Congress in-
tended to invoke its own powers to accomplish other
purposes than those enabled by the treaty, and that it has
done so.
Id. at 628 (second emphasis added). Although the treaty's
purpose was to protect migratory birds by imposing "sea-
sonal" restrictions, the United States, by its own initiative,
sought to impose "manner" regulations as well.
Congress not only departed from the international treaty
by regulating the "manner" by which migratory birds may be
killed, but also expanded the MBTA prohibitions to include
migratory bird products.
This section amends section 2 of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (16 U.S.C. 703) by making it unlawful, except as the
Secretary of the Interior may determine by regulation, to
take, sell, purchase, exchange, or ship ,any part, nest, or
egg of such bird, or any product, whether or not manufac-
tured, which consists, or is composed in whole or in part, of
any such bird or any part nest, or egg thereof . .. .'
Although the word ,product' is not mentioned in the Act
itself or in the Canadian Convention ... H.R. 10942 would
amend the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to make it clear that
the above prohibition extends to the product of any bird, or
any part, nest, or egg thereof.
S. Rep. No. 93-851, at 1 (1974). Migratory birds gained addi-
tional protection as a direct result of this amendment. The
amendment deters acquisition of "bird products." Since the
possession of a migratory bird "product" is now restricted,
bird habitats and nesting sites are less likely to be en-
croached upon.
Closely related to the prohibition of "bird products" is the
commercial exploitation of migratory birds. "As originally
enacted, violations of the MBTA or regulations promulgated
thereunder were punishable as misdemeanors." United
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States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986). However,
Congress amended the MBTA in 1960 to include a felony pro-
vision with substantially harsher penalties to deter the com-
mercial exploitation of migratory birds. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1-
2). "This amendment was intended to differentiate between
,an individual who hunts migratory birds for pleasure' and ,a
person who slaughters these wildfowl for commercial pur-
poses as a means of livelihood' and therefore to ,better protect
our migratory game birds."' Engler, 806 F.2d at 431 (quoting
S. Rep. No. 86-1779, at 1 (1960)). The United States satisfied
the international treaty's provisions by creating a misde-
meanor offense. The felony provision, extending further pro-
tection to birds by increasing criminal penalties, was enacted
by Congress to serve the goals of the United States, in-
dependent of those contemplated in international
conventions.
The United States departed from the original treaty pro-
visions establishing a regulatory scheme to efficiently protect
migratory birds by expanding the treaty to include additional
activities and increased penalties. The MBTA is not simply
an extension of an existing treaty, but has evolved into a reg-
ulatory statute in its own right. The regulatory nature of the
MBTA indicates Congress's intent to enact a strict liability
offense in an otherwise silent statute. See Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 606, 608 (1994) (discussing the regula-
tory nature of a statute as an indication of a strict liability
crime).
B. The Protection Afforded By The MBTA Is Not Only
Conferred Upon Migratory Birds, But Serves To
Benefit Society As A Whole.
The absence of a mens rea element in a criminal statute
emphasizing the "achievement of some social betterment
rather than the punishment of the crimes" is not uncommon.
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
[A] now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties
serve as effective means of regulation .. .dispenses with
the conventional requirement for criminal conduct -aware-
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ness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good
it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person other-
wise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a
public danger.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 259-260. The MBTA protects migra-
tory birds by restricting hunting practices and prohibiting
commercial exploitation. While the birds are the direct bene-
ficiaries of the regulations, the MBTA is a public welfare stat-
ute benefitting society as a whole. The "public welfare"
purpose of the MBTA favors a strict liability interpretation in
a statute lacking a mens rea element. See Staples, 511 U.S.
at 606-608 (discussing the ,public benefit' purpose of a statute
as an indication of a strict liability crime where the statute is
without an obvious expression requiring a mens rea). Re-
gardless of the offender's intent, a scienter requirement
would result in lengthy prosecutions for misdemeanor viola-
tions and congestion of court dockets, while the harm to the
environment and agriculture continues.
Migratory birds are "a great value as a source of food and
in destroying insects which are injurious to forests and forage
plants on the public domain, as well as to agricultural crops
in the United States and abroad." United States v. Schultze,
28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D.Ky. 1939); see also Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920) (discussing the importance in
protecting migratory birds as both a food resource and as a
natural form of insect containment). In light of the potential
for widespread agricultural destruction caused by herbivo-
rous insects, efficient enforcement of the MBTA is extremely
important. "[A]n interpretation requiring proof of the subjec-
tive intent of the person ... would stymie enforcement of the
MBTA." United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir.
1995). MBTA prosecutions need to be swift. A mens rea ele-
ment would require the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reason-
able doubt, the intention of the offending party. This would
necessarily require additional evidence from which to infer a
mens rea. To secure a lawful arrest and ensure a successful
conviction, law enforcement agents would be forced to wait
until an offender's actions were unambiguous prior to arrest.
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As prosecutions and enforcement increase in complexity, effi-
ciency of the statute and its beneficial impact diminish. The
benefit to society as a whole considerably outweighs requiring
a mens rea element to sustain a conviction for a MBTA mis-
demeanor violation.
C. The MBTA Is Not Rooted In Traditional Common Law
Where A Mens Rea Element May Have Been
Required.
Congress did not expressly provide a mens rea element
within the statute, nor is the statute derived from common
law where a culpable mental state element may be inferred.
The advent of the industrial revolution resulted in a depar-
ture from the common law contention that an injury can
amount to a crime only when supported by an evil intention.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251. Legislatures sought to govern
various activities, in part, by implementing criminal sanc-
tions, otherwise known as public welfare offenses. Id. Tradi-
tional notions of crime focused on direct and immediate harm
to persons or property. However, welfare regulations mini-
mized the risk and probability that harm would occur by
preemptively regulating certain activities. "[W]hatever the
intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the conse-
quences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, leg-
islation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does
not specify intent as a necessary element." Id. at 256.
The MBTA is a policy-driven statute. It serves as a "reg-
ulatory measure designed to protect the public welfare, de-
rived not from the common law but from a series of treaties
with other states." Engler, 806 F.2d at 432. Congress en-
acted the MBTA in 1918 to implement the goals of a 1916
treaty between the United States and other nations. Newton
County Wildlife Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d
110, 114 (8th Cir. 1996). The international treaty called for
the protection of certain migratory birds which "were a great
value as a source of food and in destroying insects injurious to
vegetation." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431. The
MBTA enforced the treaty by regulating the killing, captur-
ing, and selling of migratory birds included in the conven-
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/14
MOOT COURT
tion's terms. Part of the enforcement provided penal
sanctions for violations of the act. Since the MBTA's misde-
meanor violation is derived from a treaty rather than tradi-
tional common law, there is no "interpretive presumption...
in favor of implying a scienter requirement into an otherwise
silent statute." Engler, 806 F.2d at 431.
D. In View Of The Statutory Scheme, A Scienter
Requirement Is Not Required Because The MBTA's
Misdemeanor Provisions Levy Relatively Small
Penalties.
The MBTA's misdemeanor provision with its minor pen-
alties favors a strict liability interpretation of the statute.
"Historically, the penalty imposed under a statute has been a
significant consideration in determining whether the statute
should be construed as dispensing with mens rea." Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994). Generally, the con-
viction of a crime results in the offender's extensive incarcer-
ation, burdensome fines, and the loss of fundamental
privileges. In view of these particularly harsh ramifications,
the requirement of a culpable mens rea is significant. How-
ever, where "penalties... are relatively small, and conviction
does no grave danger to an offender's reputation," proof of a
culpable mens rea is unnecessary. Morissette, 342 U.S. at
256. In determining whether the MBTA's misdemeanor of-
fense falls within the category of minor-penalty strict liability
crimes, "the MBTA ... should be read as a whole to derive its
plain meaning." Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555
(11th Cir. 1997). The MBTA's misdemeanor offense, which
does not specify a mens rea element, makes it unlawful to
"take," "kill," or "capture," certain migratory birds. 16 U.S.C.
§ 703. The penalties for violating the statute provide that a
"person, association, partnership, or corporation" is guilty of
a misdemeanor and subject to a $500 fine and/or imprison-
ment not to exceed six months. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a). In con-
trast, the felony provision of the MBTA, which explicitly
requires a mens rea, prohibits the commercial exploitation of
migratory birds and subjects the offender to a $2000 fine and/
or imprisonment not to exceed two years. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b).
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Proof of scienter in a MBTA misdemeanor prosecution, with
its comparatively light penalties, would defeat the purpose of
the regulatory statute and contradict the congressional intent
to enact a strict liability criminal provision.
The statute prohibits a wide array of activities that may
harm migratory birds, including, but not limited to the hunt-
ing, killing, taking, shipping, selling, importing, exporting,
possessing of migratory birds. 16 U.S.C. § 703. The harm
caused by a violation of the misdemeanor provision is not con-
tingent upon the intent of an individual. Therefore, scienter
is not an element necessary for prosecution.
To require the government to prove the intent of the per-
son... in every case charging a misdemeanor violation of
the MBTA would produce the absurd result, clearly not
contemplated by Congress, of nullifying the ease of prose-
cution created by the designation of. .. a strict liability
crime.
United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 344-345 (4th Cir.
1995). Moreover, "an innocent technical violation on the part
of any defendant can be taken care of by the imposition of a
small or nominal fine." United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d
902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978). On the other hand, the felony provi-
sion requires the active, intentional exploitation of migratory
birds for commercial purposes. See United States v. Engler,
806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986) ("In effect, the statutory
schema presented two factual scenarios for imposing strict li-
ability on those who hunt migratory birds - if the actor hunts
for pleasure, it is a misdemeanor; if for commercial purposes,
it is a felony."). A commercial felony infraction not only re-
sults in the death of birds, but also contributes to additional
harm by a direct pecuniary gain to the offender resulting
from the birds' exploitation. Accordingly, the imposed felony
penalties are harsher than the misdemeanor penalties.
Congress specifically addressed the felony/misdemeanor
distinction in the 1986 amendment to the MBTA. "Nothing
in this amendment is intended to alter the strict liability
standard for misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C.
707(a), a standard which has been upheld in many Federal
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/14
MOOT COURT
court decisions." S. Rep. No. 99-445 at 35 (1986); see also
United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d at 343 ("All circuits which
have been faced with the question save one - the Fifth - have
now held that the misdemeanor crimes created by the MBTA
are strict liability crimes."). 5 See also United States v. Cor-
row, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. En-
gler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Chan-
dler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v.
FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Wood, 437 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1971); Rogers v. United States,
367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966).
The contraposition between the felony and misdemeanor
provisions of the MBTA supports the contention that a felony
prosecution requires proof of a scienter, while a misdemeanor
prosecution is a strict liability offense. Indicative of a strict
liability crime, the penalties imposed upon conviction of the
misdemeanor offense are comparatively light. Requiring a
mens rea element in a MBTA misdemeanor prosecution con-
tradicts both congressional intent and the statutory scheme
protecting migratory birds. Therefore, the district court prop-
erly concluded that the MBTA is a strict liability offense.
IV. THE FOREST SERVICE SATISFIED ALL
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS IN
IMPLEMENTING A FOREST
MANAGEMENT PLAN THEREBY
EXEMPTING ITSELF FROM LIABILITY UNDER
THE MBTA.
Although killing migratory birds by clearcutting forests
is a violation of the MBTA, the government's compliance with
the NFMA precludes liability under the MBTA. The Forest
Service is subject to the NFMA and derives its authority to
manage the National Forest System from this statute. 16
5. The Fifth Circuit requires a "should have known" standard of scienter,
not full-fledged intent or knowledge. United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d
910, 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
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U.S.C. §§ 1600 et seq. While Congress did not expressly ex-
empt the Forest Service from the MBTA's restrictions, a rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute permits the Forest
Service to sacrifice migratory birds when executing its duties
in accordance with the NFMA. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S.
258, 269 (1993) (holding that an agency's reasonable inter-
pretation of a statute it administers is binding). The NFMA
requires the Forest Service to develop a forest management
plan prior to any sale of timber. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). A
forest management plan must consider "multiple-use" and
"sustained-yield" provisions regarding the nation's renewable
resources. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(3). Additionally, the Forest Ser-
vice must issue an EIS regarding any significant action af-
fecting the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i). By
requiring the Forest Service to consider numerous alterna-
tives and take into account economic, environmental, and so-
cial concerns, Congress concluded that the benefits of the
timber sale made in accordance with the NFMA considerably
outweigh any potential harm caused to birds from clearcut-
ting. Therefore, the Forest Service, in compliance with all
requisite statutes and regulations is excused from liability
pursuant to the MBTA.
A. Substantial Deference Should Be Given To The Forest
Service's Decision To Exempt Itself From The MBTA.
Congress's failure to specifically include the Forest Ser-
vice in the MBTA's exemptions should not be construed to re-
move such a privilege from the Forest Service. "The power of
an administrative agency to administer a congressionally cre-
ated..... program necessarily requires the formulation of pol-
icy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (quot-
ing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). Here, Congress
enacted the NFIA to authorize the Forest Service's manage-
ment of the National Forest System. Effective management,
in accordance with the NFMA, implicitly entails clearcutting
and the concomitant killing of migratory birds. The Forest
Service's decision to sacrifice birds to benefit the greater good
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of maintaining national forests should be given substantial
deference by the courts. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction
of a statutory scheme . . . ."). Consistent with its interpreta-
tion of the MBTA and its mandate under the NFMA, the For-
est Service maintains that when it sold timber to Blackacre,
it was precluded from liability under the MBTA. This inter-
pretation of the statute is both reasonable and necessary for
compliance with the NFMA.
B. The Forest Service Exempted Itself From Liability
Under The MBTA By Complying With The Requisite
Components Of The Forest Management Plan.
The Forest Service satisfied the multiple-use provision as
required by the NFMA. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(3). Multiple-use is
defined as
the management of all the various renewable surface re-
sources of the national forests so that they are utilized in
the combination that will best meet the needs of the Amer-
ican people; making the most judicious use of the land for
some or all of these resources or related services over areas
large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic ad-
justments in use to conform to changing needs and condi-
tions; that some land will be used for less than all of the
resources; and harmonious and coordinated management
of the various resources, each with the other, without im-
pairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration
being given to the relative values of the various resources,
and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give
the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output.
16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (emphasis added). Mandating absolute
conservation of avian populations by prohibiting a timber
sale is inconsistent with multiple-use provisions. See
Headwater v. BLM, 914 F.2d 1174, 1183-1184 (9th. Cir. 1990)
(holding strict conservation of habitat and old growth forest
contradicts congressional intent). The old growth forest, in
the present case, is used for outdoor recreation and study, but
1998] 863
31
864 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
is also a valuable timber resource. Record 1. To balance
these diverse interests, the Forest Service constructed a plan
which designated some parts of the old growth forest, includ-
ing the Big Tree Tract, for logging and other parts for preser-
vation. Record 1. The Forest Service limited its timber sale
to a part of the old growth forest, including the Big Tree
Tract, thereby complying with the multiple-use provision of
the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C.
§ 528. As a result, economic efficiency is preserved by the
capital gain from the sale while the environmental quality is
preserved because new trees will grow in place of the old for-
est. The part of the forest not designated for clearcutting will
maintain viable bird populations, giving CSB continued use
and enjoyment.
The Forest Service also satisfied the sustained-yield pro-
vision required by the NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1600(3). Sus-
tained-yield is defined as "the achievement and maintenance
in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output
of the various renewable resources of the national forests
without impairment of the productivity of the land." 16
U.S.C. § 531(b). The Forest Service did not authorize the
clearcutting of the entire New Union National Forest. Record
1. Rather, substantial amounts of the forest will remain in-
tact. The designated clearcutting area is a renewable re-
source that will regenerate over time. There is no indication
that this land will be used for anything other than conserva-
tion subsequent to the sale. Therefore, the sale maintains
the output of the renewable resources without impairing the
productivity of the land. Such result is a manifestation of
congressional intent to delegate to the Forest Service author-
ity to manage forests while at the same time to protect avian
populations. Congress permits the Forest Service to balance
interests, but requires compliance with the NFMA.
The Forest Service, in compliance with the NFMA and its
regulations, issued an EIS which is required by the NEPA
any time an agency action will significantly affect the envi-
ronment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i). An EIS discloses all possi-
ble economic and social reactions to a forest management
plan. The regulation explicitly refers to maintaining viable
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bird populations. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19. In its EIS, the Forest
Service declared that clearcutting will only destroy about a
hundred nests if the timber is cut during nesting season.
Record 2. Additionally, the Plan will not concentrate its
clearcutting during the nesting season. The Plan authorizes
clearcutting over the course of the year, thereby minimizing
its impact on bird reproduction. Record 2. As a result, the
Plan will not jeopardize any viable bird populations in the
Big Tree Tract. In constructing a plan authorizing the timber
sale, the Forest Service considered various alternatives to
find one that best met the diverse interests that are served by
the old growth forest. Since the current Plan complied with
multiple-use and sustained-yield provisions, it was deemed
the best alternative by the Regional Forester and accord-
ingly, was approved. Record 1; see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(c)
(requiring the Regional Forester to consider alternative plans
to comply with normal procedure). The Forest Service pro-
vided a plan satisfying all the requirements of the NFMA,
thus exempting the Forest Service from any liability under
the MBTA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the United States of America
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district
court's decision that the issue is ripe for decision and that
CSB had standing to bring suit; reverse the district court's
decision that the MBTA is "law" with which agency actions
under the NFMA must be in accord for purposes of judicial
review under the APA; affirm the district court's decision that
the MBTA's misdemeanor offense is a strict liability crime;
and reverse the district court's decision that the United
States is not exempt from liability under the MBTA.
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